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Abstract. The paper provides identification of political causes and factors of miner protest campaigns in 
the post-soviet Russia. The following research methods have been applied: contrastive-comparative analysis 
of literature on historic, sociological, political science, philosophic and economic issues; the method of 
statistical processing of the information; historical-typological analysis and generalization of documents in 
force and archival materials; the method of historical simulation. The authors gradually identified the most 
relevant political causes and factors affecting the development of miner protest campaigns in 1992–1999. 
Their interdependence on economic and socio-cultural aspects of phenomenon under consideration is also 
revealed. A comparative analysis with the “perestroika” period (1989–1991) was carried out. The authors 
made a conclusion that socio-political and socio-economic processes in coal mining regions were highly 
dependent on the policy of the federal center. The «experimental» nature of reforms in coal mining industry 
was not supported by additional political powers of leaders in coal mining territories, as the result, the 
policy was far behind economy and the social sphere of miners. Regional and local authorities were in the 
conditions of natural (market) selection; therefore, they spent most of their time keeping their political 
positions by any means, without any attempts to solve the problems in miner towns and settlements. 
Introduction 
The reasons, due to which miners and their families had 
to face the most social and economic problems in the 
1990-s, were political mistakes and oversights at all 
governmental levels. Political authorities of the country 
relied too much on outside assistance and were not able 
to take the advantages of liberal reforms in some 
European countries. They also under-evaluated its own 
historical experience in conducting market 
transformations. The situation was worsened by urgent 
challenges in the country and within the international 
scope (confrontation between the president and the 
Parliament, radical trends in the state structure, the 
situation in the Balkans). In the early 1990-s, a period of 
serious political conflicts began in the Russian society. 
Both Russian and foreign scientists studied political 
causes and factors of Russian miners’ protest campaigns 
(1992–1999). All historians emphasized high proneness 
to conflicts in the post-soviet society because the reality 
contradicted expectations. A new system of socio-
political relations was especially complicated for the 
employees of coal mining industry, supporting Yeltsin 
on his way to reforms for a very long time. The papers of 
Russian and foreign authors differ mainly in their 
attitude to political reasons of evolving miners’ protest 
campaigns. Miners made an emphasis on personality of 
the president B. Yeltsin who was not able to ensure 
adequate living standards for them. This fact accentuated 
inhomogeneity and internal contradictions in miner 
community.  
Materials and methods 
In the paper, the following research methods have been 
applied: contrastive-comparative analysis of literature on 
historic, sociological, political science, philosophic and 
economic issues; method of statistical treatment of 
information; historical-typological analysis and 
generalization of documents in force and archival 
materials; method of historian simulation. The authors 
collected memories of more than 20 people who took 
part in the events under consideration in order to 
supplement investigation with little-studied details. 
Results and discussion 
Some phases, distinguished by the impact of certain 
causes and factors, are identified in the development of 
miners’ protest campaigns.  
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In view of political relations between miners and 
authorities, the first phase (1992–1997) is the most 
contradictory one. It caused the long-continual character 
of miners’ dissatisfaction with the policy of the Kremlin. 
Protest campaigns were developing smoothly in the 
period under consideration mainly due to hopes of 
miners that the government could carry out political and 
economic reforms the strikers had insisted on in 1989-
1991.  
As liberal transformations were initiated, employees 
in the coal mining regions strived for keeping their 
important position and function in social and political 
processes they had had since 1989. The breakdown of 
the USSR and establishment of a new Russian statehood 
changed the political status of the miner community; it 
became a key champion of reformatory Yeltsin’s ideas 
among common workers. No wonder, miners aspired to 
better positions in a newly formed system of social and 
political relations. But their claims on both a special 
position and an important role in political processes 
within the country were unsubstantiated.  
In their turn, miners did not want to accept such 
political, moreover, social and economic situation. In the 
early 1990-s they thought they could influence the policy 
of their region and the country on the whole. The latest 
experience of the soviet system collapse made them 
think they would have been successful if the government 
had been placed under pressure. Moreover, the authority 
of miners in coal-mining regions and in the country on 
the whole was quite significant at that time. The 
profession of miners always distinguished them for their 
high courage and fortitude against the background of 
other workers. This fact provoked independent struggle 
and brought them together with anti-governmental social 
and political forces and some politicians. They needed 
their own president, who could reserve miners’ status of 
“working elite”. Finally, miners changed their attitude to 
B. Yeltsin, having become not his supporters, but active 
opponents. 
The inertia of high political engagement in the staff 
of coal-mining enterprises, glorification of their strike 
movement etc. provoked new mass protest actions; 
undermined discipline, and had a negative impact on 
production management. The struggle of workers in coal 
mining industry was similar to “perestroika” protests.  
Therefore, miners’ efforts to spread their influence 
on social and political processes in the country were 
often destructive because of illegal protest actions; in 
fact, they undermined stability in coal-mining regions.  
The positive evolution character of protest actions 
was caused by opposition of miners’ trade unions – the 
Independent Trade Union of Russian Miners and 
Rosugleprof. They differed in their origin, political 
guidelines, goals and objectives, as a consequence, they 
were in opposition to each other. The Independent Trade 
Union of Russian Miners supported the president, while 
industry-specific managerial bodies relied on 
Rosugleprof, which was close to the Communist party 
[2]. 
Since the first year of market transformations, trade 
union organizations had been fighting severely for 
dominance among miners, first of all, in mass media. In 
conditions of economic decline and worsening of social 
situation in miners’ towns and settlements, mass protest 
actions organized by Rosugleprof demoralized the 
activity of the Independent Trade Union of Russian 
Miners. In this case, the latter had to change its tactics of 
battling for miners’ interests. Supporting democratic and 
market reforms of the president, the Independent Trade 
Union of Russian Miners often criticized particular 
actions of the Government of the Russian Federation and 
called upon its supporters for protest actions. Fighting 
for the leadership, these organizations took part in 
demonstrative protest actions; some of them were radical 
ones.   
In the end, the miner community became separated 
and uncoordinated, as the result, the solidarity of the 
strategy and tactics of struggle weakened. Miners got 
more dissatisfied because of general political instability 
in the country and in coal mining regions. The reason for 
this instability consisted in opposition of legislative and 
executive branches of government. As a rule, legislative 
bodies of all levels represented the interests of people 
dissenting with the methods of “shock therapy”. Political 
conflict of the president and the Supreme Soviet of the 
RSFSR was the most critical. In these conditions, 
workers of coal-mining industry were divided into 
supporters and opponents of these government 
institutions. In 1992 working committees and the 
Independent Trade Union of Russian Miners actively 
involved miners into actions to support economic 
reforms of the president, opposed to “the conservative” 
parliament. 
Meanwhile, the sympathy of miners with B. Yeltsin 
was not as mass as in 1989–1991. On the contrary, such 
campaigns were not apprehended both by other groups 
of workers and by miners in coal mining regions. The 
key cause was in worsening living standards of 
population conditioned by liberal reforms. Attempts of 
the legislative power to correct the course of “shock 
therapy” led to bigger chaos and difficult political crisis 
in autumn 1993, which was surmounted by adoption of a 
new Constitution and elections into the State Duma.    
However, local legislative authorities, being beyond 
the control of the president of the Russian Federation, 
supported the struggle of miners for their labor rights 
and social guarantees in regions. The attempts of the 
executive governmental branch to “get hold of” 
“obedient” deputies were unsuccessful.  
“Dual power”, being not so decisive though, was also 
typical for the country after adoption of the new 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. It manifested 
itself in constant competing accusations of the president 
and deputies of opposition in the State Duma, in such 
issues as acceptance of unreal budgets, etc. Severe 
struggle of legislative power against the executive 
governmental branch caused political chaos in the 
country and in coal-mining regions.  
Radical reforms gave birth to radical opposition. 
Miners’ protest moods were seriously affected by “left” 
parties and movements, since the mid 1990-s. 
Dissemination of left-patriotic attitudes in the milieu of 
miners was not as successful as in other groups of 
workers, but they became unavoidable due to political 
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weakness of the Kremlin, unfair character of reforms, 
growing corruption etc. The authorities of the 
government and the president of the Russian Federation 
were steadily going down.  
A number of failures in inward and international 
affairs raised an issue of the Russian state substantiate 
possibility as a comprehensive whole. After the Supreme 
Soviet of the RSFSR had been dissolved, B. Yeltsin 
could not shift the blame of mistakes and errors of 
judgments of “shock therapy” on other political 
institutions. As a consequence, coal-mining workers 
entered into alliance with left-patriotic forces with the 
communist Party of the Russian Federation as a chief 
player. This alliance became a political top-priority of 
miners at that time. Social-economic and political mottos 
of socialism-oriented organizations and those of miners 
gradually coincided. They received evidence that 
democracy would not make people rich automatically.   
The influence of left organizations on miners 
increased after the communist party had won the 
elections into the State Duma in 1995. The communist 
party gained in popularity among the common people 
because of its uncompromising attitude to the methods of 
market transformations. The communists and their 
representatives organized and took part in mass and 
radical protest actions of miners. Their views were taken 
into account in the claims of miners arranging protests. 
The presidential elections in 1996 made it evident that B. 
Yeltsin had much fewer supporters than one thought in 
the Kremlin [7]. 
The second phase (January–July 1998) was 
characterized by the culminating crisis phenomena in 
social and political conditions of the country and coal 
mining regions. The surge of miners’ displease was 
caused mainly by the weak line of command, to say 
more, there was no single political position of the 
executive power at all levels. The Kremlin was not able 
to create an efficient mechanism to coordinate actions 
with authorities of the Russian Federation constituents. 
Measures taken to solve social and industrial conflicts 
were uncoordinated, even contradictory.   
The Kremlin did not have a clear view of crises 
phenomena in the economy of the country, especially in 
depressive regions. The heads of Russian Federation 
constituents were blamed for many social and economic 
difficulties, while the real assistance from the center 
came at extraordinary moments. It undermined miners’ 
faith in laws and order and made the heads of Russian 
Federation constituents turn into hidden opposition or 
open dissent to the Kremlin. The shift in the electoral 
system towards electing heads of subjects of the 
federation worsened the interrelations of the center with 
heads of coal-mining regions. A strong regional anti-
president coalition was formed.  
The spring of 1998 was distinguished by the 
governmental crisis, which complicated the solution of 
urgent issues in coal-mining regions. The resignation of 
Chernomyrdin increased the irresponsibility of state 
authorities in terms of the relations with workers of coal-
mining industry. The workers were disoriented in a 
proper address of their claims. Representatives of the 
government occasionally visited an explosive part of the 
country, but did not make any attempts to find an 
integrated solution of miners’ problems.   
In the government of the Russian Federation there 
was nobody who could negotiate with miners because 
various problems of coal-mining were in the competence 
of different departments of Ministry of Fuel and Energy. 
The Cabinet of Ministers often violated the agreements 
made earlier and digressed from its own policy of social 
compliance. On the eve of “rail wars” in May the 
president and the government gave promises to provide 
the industry with supplementary finances. The character 
of those promises was revealed from the results of All-
Russian Congress of Coal-Mining Industry Workers in 
April 1998. Despite this fact, ministers accused miners in 
making unreal demands [3] and were hardly interested in 
having a dialog with them.  
A new head of the Cabinet of Ministers S. Kirienko 
did not respond properly to the claims of miners, making 
the miners’ ideas of a “good” president and a “bad” 
government groundless. The illusions of the most 
employees that B. Yeltsin had a political potential were 
dispelled completely. Contradictions between the biggest 
part of the miners’ community and governmental bodies 
obtained a character of naked hostility and threatened 
with social fallout in May 1998.  
In general, the Federal Government did not react 
properly to social and economic problems in towns and 
settlements of miners because they were unimportant to 
them. This underestimation worsened the relations with 
workers of coal mining industry and led to open and 
uncompromising struggle in May – July 1998. 
Confrontation between executive and legislative 
governmental branches was in the center of social and 
political instability during the first and second phases. It 
was not as apparent and uncompromising as in the early 
1990-s, but sometimes proneness to conflicts reached its 
culmination. The opposition party of the State Duma was 
supported by the legislative authorities in coal-mining 
regions, so its deputies have more courage to confront 
the president. Opposition parties gained their popularity 
due to sharp criticism of social and economic policy of 
the Kremlin in the Lower House of the Parliament.  
The confrontation between the president and the Sate 
Duma got sharper because of the constitution of the new 
Cabinet of Ministers in March 1998. This confrontation 
led to a long governmental crisis. An attempt of 
impeachment of the president, initiated by the group of 
the Communist party in the State Duma was a show 
action.  
The fight of two branches of government did not 
facilitate taking well-timed measures to overcome crisis 
in the economy on the whole and in coal mining 
industry, in particular. Bankruptcy of populist 
governmental mottos in May – July 1998 caused mass, 
radical, illegal but legitimate protest actions of workers.  
In general, ongoing confrontation of two 
governmental branches did not support solutions, which 
could improve the living standards of workers. 
Evolving miners’ struggle was conditioned by a 
serious lag of the legal sphere from the principles of 
political and social-economic relations. The mechanism 
was not efficient even for protection of labor rights of 
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workers when it was necessary to find the guilty for 
arrears in payment. There were three reasons: no 
regulatory structure to investigate economic crimes, 
immature of legal culture and inefficient activities of law 
enforcement agencies. 
In the period under consideration, there were no legal 
documents or methods to investigate business law 
offences, which could meet the new market reality [4]. 
Corrupt directors of companies, dishonest agents and 
other partners of workers could decline the 
responsibility.  
Insufficient legal culture of citizens manifested itself 
in inadequate information how their economic rights and 
interests could be upheld. Although this information 
could be found in legislative acts, the rights of workers 
and employees of government-financed companies were 
not guarantied or broken. However, only some of them 
applied to law-enforcement agencies, a fortiori, in coal-
mining regions. On the one hand, law-enforcement 
agencies were distrusted, people did not want to have 
long and annoying lawsuits. On the other hand, it was 
assumed that radical protest campaigns could enable the 
process of drawing the salaries that were held over. 
Insufficient immediacy, efficiency and independency 
of law-enforcement agencies, as well as growing 
corruption among the employees of these agencies 
became evident for everybody.  
Up to “rail wars” in May 1998 no sufficient measures 
were taken by employees of public prosecutor’s office to 
ensure discipline; administrative cases were not brought 
before the court, everybody knew about months-long 
arrears of payment though.  
As the result, the second period was distinguished by 
widely occurring radical protest actions. Constant 
disability of the legal system to solve labor conflicts in a 
civilized way was the reason for these actions.  
Inefficient activities of regional and local authorities, 
especially in solution of social and economic problems 
were key causes why miners’ protests got more radical. 
The weakness of governmental bodies in the coal mining 
regions in 1990-s is emphasized by many factors. They 
are: essential decline in production, high level of 
unemployment, purposeless use of budgetary funds, a 
low level of charged taxes, growth of corruption, 
increasing number of crimes, uncertain and contradictory 
actions of law enforcement bodies etc. Social and 
political stability was also threatened by financially 
violating actions of authorities in coal mining regions, 
first of all, in the field of budgetary policy.  
The authorities of coal-mining regions supporting 
miners’ campaigns often tried to readdress the protests to 
central governmental bodies and directors [6]. It made 
knotty problems in relations of the Russian Federation 
constituents with the Kremlin even more complicated, 
and restricted possibilities of authorities to solve large-
scale labor conflicts.  
The weakness of authorities in coal mining regions 
was conditioned both by insufficient political and 
economic support on the part of the Kremlin and 
professional immature of many politicians being in 
power at that time to implement their own slogans, 
declared in the late 1980-s and in the early 1990-s.  
Low economic efficiency of reforms, insufficient 
financing and lack of command line weakened the 
activities of municipal governmental bodies over the 
1990-s. The heads of miner towns and settlements, 
especially small and mono-profiled ones were in very 
difficult conditions.  
Local authorities made the following irresponsible 
mistakes: population was not kept informed about new 
places of work, impracticable promises were declared, 
they hoped so much to get assistance from regional and 
federal governments, they did not respond to mass 
violations of labor laws etc. Local administration was 
uncertain, inconsistent in contacts with participants of 
the protests, as the result, radical viewpoints of miners 
got stronger.  
Therefore, the second phase was distinguished by the 
increase of political causes and factors influencing 
activation of miners’ protest campaigns. It is also 
important they had a complex and interrelated nature. 
Stagnating and liberal executive power (western experts 
also noted it [8]) endangered economic order and 
political integrity of the country.  
The third phase (August 1998 – 1999) is 
distinguished by falling political stringency in coal 
mining regions. After serious shocks since August 1998 
they and the whole country witnessed that the social and 
political situation was gradually getting more stable. On 
the other hand, positive processes in inward policy 
balanced on the edge of social collapse. Top-priority 
issues of miners were as urgent as before.  
Over the third phase, which was rather short, the 
Cabinet of Ministers was changed three times. 
Governmental crises were unavoidable elements of 
political situation in the country. The inward policy of B. 
Yeltsin could not be predicted and influence the solution 
of social and economic problems in coal mining regions. 
This government reshuffle made left-patriotic and other 
political forces insistently criticize the Kremlin and 
furthered the growth of opposition viewpoints in the 
society. 
The change of the government had the most negative 
impact on living standards in miner towns and 
settlements when the country suffered from the 
outcomes of international financial and economic crisis. 
After default on August, 17, in 1998 and before the new 
government headed by E. Primakov had been formed 
nobody dealt with the problems of coal mining industry. 
The complex situation in the economy and social sphere 
of the country including back pay of salaries and 
pensions got more complicated because there was no 
Cabinet of Ministers in the country.  
The change of the government was accompanied by 
failures of inward policy of the president, promoted 
growth of opposition viewpoints both in various strata of 
society and among heads of the Russian Federation 
constituents. In autumn 1998, 79 heads of regions came 
out against B. Yeltsin (according to the results of voting 
in the Soviet of Federation) [1]. So, the stable anti-
president regional coalition was formed. 
The surge of opposition viewpoints in Russian 
society in spring – summer, 1998, was an additional 
factor of activating political activities of opposition 
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parliament and non-parliament parties and movements. 
Their main goal was to increase influence on labor 
movement, including miners. Forms and methods to 
raise their impact were different, but all of them criticize 
their opponents in order to attract miners’ attention.  
Opposition parliament parties (the Communists, 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia etc.) made attempts 
to extend the sphere of their influence by attracting votes 
of population in coal mining regions while struggling for 
seats in the State Duma. Addressing the electorate they 
gave protest actions of miners and their radical slogans 
moral support and used populist ideas. Therefore, 
opposition parliament parties undermined prestige of the 
president, their trust to his social and economic policy 
and incited the electorate of miner towns and settlements 
to continue anti-president struggle. 
The Communist party was the most opposition-
oriented one, which set the course for mass protest 
campaigns all over the country in September 1998, 
collected money to support miners’ protests in Moscow, 
arranged the preparation of the general political strike [5] 
etc.
1998 – 1999 was a period when a number of new 
radical social and political organizations acting in the 
name of workers appeared. Their actions were directed 
at consolidation of workers of various professions to 
uphold their class interests. It was an additional impulse 
to increase social and political tensions in coal-mining 
settlements and towns.  
In general, activation of opposition parliament and 
non-parliament parties, as well as social and political 
organizations was a key factor of ongoing protest 
potential of miners. Their wide range gave miners an 
opportunity to find an opposition group they trusted.  
To sum up, political dissatisfaction of miners was not 
so strong during the third phase and turned latent for 
some objective and subjective reasons. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of political causes and factors of protest 
campaigns of miners let the authors make a conclusion 
that socio-political and socio-economic processes in coal 
mining regions were highly dependent on the policy of 
the federal center. The «experimental» nature of reforms 
in coal mining industry was not supported by additional 
political powers of leaders in coal mining territories; as 
the result, the policy was far behind the economy and 
social sphere of miners. Regional and local authorities 
were in the conditions of market selection. 
Consequently, they spent most of their time keeping 
their political positions by any means, without any 
attempts to solve the problems of miner towns and 
settlements.  
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